LOOKING BACK – A speech by Jeptha W. Dennis, JR. Colonel, USAF for the Warner Robins chapter of SOLE – printed in the Logistics Spectrum [V10N3], Fall 1976
As Logisticians we are proceeding at a tremendous pace into a future of unknowns and unpredictable. These are not signposts or road maps to show us where we are going. Sometimes however, in looking back we can get a better idea on the basis of the many indicators that are available to us. During our Bicentennial Year [Ed: US – 1976], it is especially appropriate for us to look back through the pages of logistics history to see where we have been in the hopes of being able to determine where we are going.
In the earliest times fighting men provided their own equipment and supplies or lived off the land to considerable extent. It is not much different during colonial period when the early settlers kept themselves armed against attacks by Indians. They had their own guns and provided their own supplies with they kept close at hand. The revolutionary War changed all that as the continental troops ranged throughout the colonies. In some cases they lived off the land, but for the most part they had to be supplied, and it was not an easy task. Powder, lead and salt were the strategic materials: guns, axes, knives, and shot molds the equipment of war. These had to be gotten to them wherever they went.
The difficulties met in supplying the army, however, were due not so much to the exhaustion of resources in the colonies as to the inability of the government to mobilize the available resources though an efficient system of procurement and supply. It was a subsistence economy on a localized basis with little inter-shipment of materials among the colonies except by ship and wagon. As a result the colonies were never able to mobilize more than a fraction of their available resources. For example months after a much needed shipment of clothing arrived at Portsmouth none had been moved more than 150 miles. It has been said that requisitions and materials along with the supply lines at a rate of only 1.5 miles per hour.
The Army was often faced with food shortages with again and again required soldiers to go on half, one quarter and even one-eighth rations for weeks at a time and threatened the complete disintegration of the colonial cause. Conditions of feat and famine were often separated by fifty miles or less. Add to this the fact that supply of the colonial forces was handled by committees and one wonders how we ever won the war especially since the history books indicate that the committees were not without their Proxmires. Finally at the end of the war, departments headed by single administrators, were adopted. …
And now for a moment let’s look at the Navy. The Navy wasn’t really begun until 24 March 1794, then congress passed a bill authorizing construction of warships. [Ed: The USN claims 13 October 1775 as the date of its official establishment.] To show you that things haven’t really changed much over the years, I would like to recount some of the supply and funding problems encountered in the construction of those ships. I am sure you will appreciate the similarity with present day problems. The program called for the building of six frigates at a cost of $688,888.32. The problems incident to the construction of those are manifold. It was intended that the six frigates would be afloat in 1795. However, the Secretary of War’s Report to the House of Representatives in December 1794 concerning the progress on the construction of the ships indicated late delivery. In his report, he noted, “that everything, if not to be created, was to be modified. That the wood of which the frames were to be made was stranding in the forest; the iron for the cannon laying in its natural bed; and the flax and hemp perhaps in their seed.”
It soon became apparent that only enough live oak could be delivered for the construction of three frigates, and work had to be suspended on the remaining ships. The reprogramming of unexpected funds covered part of the excess costs over the original estimates. Six Frigates had been estimated to cost $688,888.32. The actual cost came to $926,267.55 for just three frigates. Taxes weren’t any more popular than they are now and there was increasing pressure to reduce the national debt which stood at almost $80 mission. As a result, there was a congressional inquiry into the “apparently enormous” cost of building the three frigates. In spite of all these problems, the three ships put to sea in the summer of 1798 and were found to be among the best ever built. [Ed: See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
The American Civil War brought on a new era in the methods and equipment of war and logistics. The industrial age which proceeded it brought vast improvements in transportation. Population increased tenfold and national wealth 20 fold. It was possible to raise, equip and support armed forces on a larger scale proportionately then during the Revolution. There was also a growing recognition of the importance of weakening the enemy by cutting off or destroying the economic bases of his military strength.
The Anaconda Plan, the naval blockage of southern ports, had a strangling effect on the south, and was a significant factor in the defeat. The south out of necessity introduced the controlled and directed was economy and put a priority on the use of transportation facilities. The south was closer to total mobilization that the north even been. Over one million men out of a total population of 5.5 million served in the military for three years.
From the Civil War to WWI great advances were made in industrial technology and in the weapons of war and our national wealth continued to increase. Huge conscript armies of millions of men were mobilized. Expenditures of ammunition and other supplies increased tremendously. At the beginning of the war, for example, the British expended shells at a rate of 2,000 a week. By the end of the war the number had increased to 100,000. During the course of the war, it became obvious that the outcome would depend largely on the ability of the belligerents to meet the heavy drain on their productive resources. Supply problems developed and the government had to establish controls over production facilities. Thus, a war economy was born. The war industries board served as a kind of industrial general staff, which was very small in comparison to the war production Board of World war II which patterned after it.
The Second Ward War saw the destruction of enemy defense posture. The Korean War and the Vietnam War made it necessary for us to maintain a high level of preparedness and a close link between the armed forces and industrial community. The size, complexity and exacting requirements of the materials of modern war present some real problems in converting industrial facilities, equipment and labor to their production…And there is less time in which to do so.
It poses some real challenges to those of us in Logistics…The challenge to find better more efficient methods…The challenge to reduce the burdensome costs. Historical trends indicate that all of the services must work together as a team, that we must forego any inclination toward parochialism when it is in the best interest of the nation to take a certain course of actions. As our future unfolds we must recognize the importance of maintain a strong initial capability which will serve us in every possible contingency with speed and effectiveness, and we must recognize the historical arrows with point to our industrial resources as a key target in an aggressive action.
Our central challenge as we enter our nation’s third century, therefore, is to strengthen the teamwork which exists among the services and without partners in the industrial field. This we must do if we are to maintain our military capability as the weapons of war become even more technically sophisticated and the logistics problems increasingly complex. We must also recognize that while we are struggling simultaneously to cut costs and improve our defense capability, we will be under pressure to reduce our expenditures even further.
There are those who would distort the facts and point to the military-industrial complex as a greedy monster gobbling up dollars needed for humanitarian programs. From then we hear the same old refrain: “We can’t afford a defense budget of the present size: defense funds should be slashed and such reduction should be used to increase appropriations for health, education, mass transit or non-military government programs”. The more exuberant critics claim the defense budget is soaring out of control. The facts properly interpreted, however, present quite a different picture. … Fortunately, there are some in high places who are well aware of the declining defense budget as related to total government expenditures. …
In answer to those who demand a revisions of our priorities with regard to the defense budget, the truth is that our spending priorities have already been revised across the board. … No one can seriously challenge the proposition that there must be significant reductions in federal spending. But defense spending is only one segment of the national budget and we cannot fight inflation at the total expense of military preparedness.
There is no way to shirk or escape this burden without weakening our national safety and security. For the sad truth is that despite détente, military power is by no means irrelevant in the modern world. It is a real, tangible, and in indispensable element of our national and international policy; for after all war, as defined by Karl Von Clausewitz, is a political instrument, a continuation of political relations by their means. It is the ultimate form of Diplomacy. …
President Ford also made reference to George Washington which brings me back to my original thesis that – What is past is prologue – For a look back through the pages of History shows George Washington faced challenges not unlike those we face today. The Congress he serves as the Continental Army’s Commander In Chief lacked decisive leaders. It was more concerned with other matters. Inflation was rampant. Funds to quip the Army were extremely short so much so that the troops often went without pay for long periods of time. Supply problems were incredible and the Army had to retreat from one battle to another much of the war.
But Washington persevered, as we must do as we search out innovations – New methods, procedures, and equipment which will add to our strength as we resist the efforts without which would weaken us through irresponsible budgetary cuts. Let us therefore face these challenges with resolve. We as Logisticians have unique responsibilities in our chosen fields of endeavor and with these responsibilities lie exciting opportunities. Let us not let them slip away.
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Ed: Some inaccurate and dated material was removed. Please reply to me or SOLE HQ [solehq@erols.com] for a scanned original copy of this printed speech.